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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EXPRESS COMPANY, a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

vs.

8659

STATE TAX COMMISSION and THE
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Respondent agrees substantially with the statement of
facts as they appear on pages 3 and 4 of appellant's brief.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE UTAH SALES TAX ACT SUBJECTS TO
TAXATION ALL SALES OF MOTOR VEHICLES.
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POINT II.
SEMI-TRAILERS ARE MOTOR VEHICLES
WITHIN THE SALES TAX ACT.

I

~ .•

:.,

~ Jnc ..-

l~v:erei

POINT III.

>T~.d

:t~

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
THE ACTION SINCE IT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UTAH SALES TAX ACT SUBJECTS TO
TAXATION ALL SALES OF MOTOR VEHICLES.
The arguments in points 1 and 4 of appellant's brief
seem to center around the following statutory language
contained in 59-15-2(e), U. C. A. 1953, as amended:
"But the term 'retail sales' is not intended to
include isolated nor occasional sales by persons not
regularly engaged in business * * *, provided
however, that no sale of a motor vehicle shall be
deemed isolated or occasional for the purposes of
this act."

It would seem that there are three possible alternatives
as to the meaning of this statutory language. They are:
( 1) that it was meant to tax sales of motor vehicles only
by retailers regularly engaged in the business of selling
motor vehicles; (2) that it was meant to tax sales of motor
vehicles by all retailers and retailers only; or (3) that it
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was meant to impose a tax on the sale of all motor vehicles
within this state.
The first alternative can be immediately ruled out. If
such were the case, the language would add nothing to the
Sales Tax Act, as Sec. 59-15-4, U. C. A. 1953, already levies
a tax upon "every retail sale of tangible personal property
made within the state of Utah." If the wording in question
were to be so construed, one of these sections would mean
nothing. This court has held several times that proper
statutory construction requires that significance be accorded every part of a statute. Glenn v. Ferrell, 5 Ut. 2d
439, 304 P. 2d 380; Dunn v. Bryan, 77 Ut. 604, 299 Pac. 253.
The second alternative is the one which appellant apparently urges the court to adopt. It argues that the Sales
Tax Act is completely restricted to sales by retailers; that
therefore the exemption as to isolated or occasional sales also
applies only to retailers; and that the language excluding
motor vehicles from the classification of isolated or occasional sales is intended to require a tax on all sales of motor
vehicles by retailers. Such an interpretation would require
a tax on sales of motor vehicles by all regular retailers no
matter what line of goods the retailer happened ordinarily
to sell. Under this construction, a tax would be required
on the sale of a car by a grocer or a service station operator,
but not on the sale of a car by a barber or a doctor. It is
immediately apparent that such a construction would raise
grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the statute. As
appellant ably stresses under Point 4 of its brief, such a
classification would be unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive
and discriminatory and the distinction would rest on no
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reasonable basis. It seems odd that appellant would urge
the court to adopt a construction which it admits is unconstitutional, in light of the well recognized and universal
rule that where two meanings may fairly be given an act,
one rendering it in harmony, and the other in conflict with
the constitution, the former must always prevail. State
Water Pollution Board v. Salt Lake City, ... Ut. 2d ... ,
311 P. 2d 370; Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Ut. 2d 191, 291 P.
2d 400; Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm., 72 Ut. 536,
271 P. 961; Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Ut. 170,
97 P. 2d 937; State v. Packard, 122 Ut. 369, 250 P. 2d 561.
The final alternative, i. e. that all sales of motor vehicles are subject to the sales tax, is the one which the Tax
Commission asserted and the one which the trial court
adopted. This interpretation gives effect to all parts of the
Sales Tax Act and is in accord with the obvious intention
of the legislature (See argument under Point II). No doubts
could be raised as to its constitutionality as the act would
apply to everyone equally. This interpretation is in full
accord with the following statement of tnis court in the case
of Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Ut. 170, 97 P. 2d

r .:

i:i!

937:
"Moreover, in seeking to give effect to the intent of the legislature the court will adopt that interpretation of a taxing statute which lays the tax
burden uniformly on all standing in the same degree
with relation to the tax adopted * * * And will
avoid an interpretation which would lead to an impractical, unfair, or unreasonable result."
Such interpretation is also supported by the ordinary
rules of statutory construction. Sec. 59-15-4, U. C. A. 1953,
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imposes a broad and general tax on sales by retailers. However, the legislature did not stop at this point, but more
specifically provided that "no sale of a motor vehicle shall
be deemed isolated or occasional for the purposes of this
act." It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that
specific statutory provisions will prevail over broad general
provisions. Nelden v. Clark, 20 Ut. 382, 59 P. 524; University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Ut. 457, 59 P. 96.
As further support for the trial court's holding that all
sales of motor vehicles are subject to the sales tax, we refer
to Sec. 59-15-5, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, which deals with
the collection of the tax. This section was amended in 1949
by the same act which amended Sec. 59-15-2(e) to exclude
motor vehicles from the category of isolated or occasional
sales (see Chapter 83, Laws of 1949). Therefore, the two
provisions may be considered in pari materia. See Weber
v. Pinyan, (Cal.) 61 P. 2d 954. The 1949 amendment to
Sec. 59-15-5 states as follows:

"* * * Provided, however, that on all motor vehicle sales made by other than a regular licensed dealer the tax shall be paid by the purchaser
directly to the State Tax Commission upon every
sale of a motor vehicle subject to registration and
licensing under the laws of this state, and shall be
collected by the State Tax Commission at the time
of such registration and licensing."
If the tax was not meant to apply to every sale of a

motor vehicle there would be no need to require direct payment to the State Tax Commission, as all regular retailers
are already collecting agents for the state. When this
amendment is considered together with Sec. 59-15-2 (e),
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U. C. A. 1953, as amended, it appears that the legislature
clearly intended that no sale of a motor vehicle, whether
made by a retailer or any other person, should be exempt
from the sales tax.
POINT II.
SEMI-TRAILERS ARE MOTOR
WITHIN THE SALES TAX ACT.

VEHICLES

Since the sales tax act provides that "no sale of a motor vehicle shall be deemed isolated or occasional for the
purposes of this act" (59-15-2 (e) U. C. A. 1953, as
amended) it becomes necessary to define the term "motor
vehicle." As pointed out by the appellant this term is nowhere defined in the Sales Tax Act. Appellant would have
the court apply the definition of motor vehicle as contained
in the Motor Vehicle Act of this state. However, this act
bears little relationship to the Sales Tax Act and should
not be controlling in defining the term as it is there employed. (See Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 75 S. E. 2d 688, S. C. 1953, where it was
held that the definition of motor vehicle in an unrelated
statute had no application.)
In interpreting a statute, the primary obligation of the
court is to give effect to the intention of the legislature.
Norville v. State Tax Co'mmission, 98 Ut. 170, 97 P. 2d 937;
West Beverage Co. v. Hansen, 98 Ut. 332, 96 P. 2d 1105;
Utah Light & Traction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 92 Ut.
404, 68 P. 2d 759. As stated in the Norville case, supra:
"In the exposition of a statute the intention of
the lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of
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the terms ; and its reason and intention will prevail
over the strict letter. When the words are not explicit the intention is to be collected from the context; from the occasion and necessity of the law;
from the mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and
this intention is to be taken or presumed according
to what is consonant with reason and good discretion."
It is the contention of respondent that the obvious

legislative intent was to tax vehicles of the type
required to be licensed and registered in this state. Such
category would include semi-trailers, as 41-1-19, U. C. A.
1953, as amended, specifically requires them to be registered.
When the Utah Legislature decided to create a sales
tax, it was necessary to do so in a practical manner. The
Legislature, therefore, laid down a general policy of taxing
only those sales by regular retailers, and exempted isolated
and occasional sales. The reason for this exemption was
plainly because of the collection problem. It would be grossly
impractical, if not absolutely impossible, to tax isolated
and occasonal sales by persons not regularly engaged in
business; the Tax Commission would have no way of finding out about such sales, nor could there be any economical
method of collecting sales tax. The Sales Tax Act, therefore, was primarily made to apply only to sales by retailers
from their inventories of goods held for resale. The retailer is made the collector for the Tax Commission, and in
this manner the act is efficiently administered.
The same considerations, however, do not apply to
sales of vehicles which are subject to the registration laws
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of the state of Utah. Here there exists a practical and
efficient method for collecting sales tax, even though the
vehicle is not sold by a regular retailer. Since it is necessary for the owner to register the vehicle, it is both practical and convenient to collect the tax at that time.
Further considerations also make it apparent that the
legislature intended to impose the tax upon all vehicles
subject to registration. On August 25, 1950, pursuant to
Section 59-15-20, U. C. A. 1953, which confers upon the
State Tax Commission the authority to administer the Sales
Tax Act, the commission promulgated and published a regulation which reads as follows:

t
(:

, .•.·.
..~:-: ;

"No sale of a vehicle subject to the registration
laws of this state shall be deemed an isolated or
occasional sale." (See Sales Tax Regulation 38.)
Respondent recognizes that no administrative body can by
regulation supersede the will of the legislature. However,
since this regulation was promulgated, the legislature of
this state has had occasion to meet four times not counting
special sessions. In spite of the fact that the legislature has
had the Sales Tax Act brought to its attention and amended
it in various places, no change has been made in the language interpreted by this regulation. It is submitted that
where a law which is susceptible of interpretation has been
given a particular construction by administrative regulation,
and the legislature has allowed the same to stand for a
period of time, it is entitled to great respect as being a true
expression of the legislative purpose. State v. Alta Club, 120
Ut. 121, 232 P. 2d 759; Olsen v. State Tax Commission,
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109 Ut. 563, 168 P. 2d 324; Utah Power & Light v. Public
Service Commission, 107 Ut. 155, 152 P. 2d 542; In re
Cowan's Estate, 98 Ut. 393, 99 P. 2d 605; Decker v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 94 Ut. 166, 76 P. 2d 568; Murdock v.
Mabey, 59 Ut. 346, 203 P. 651; State Board of Land Com'rs
v. Ririe, 56 Ut. 213, 190 P. 59.
Also the Sales Tax Act itself refers in several places
to vehicles subject to registration. Section 59-15-5 (U. C.
A. 1953, as amended), which deals with the collection of
the tax, states as follows:
"However, that on all motor vehicle sales made
by other than a regular licensed dealer the tax shall
be paid by the purchaser directly to the State Tax
Commission upon every sale of a motor vehicle subject to registration and licensing, under the laws of
this state, and shall be collected by the State Tax
Commission at the time of such registration and
licensing." (Emphasis added.)
As recently as 1957 the legislature has dealt with the
Sales Tax Act. At 59-15-6, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, it
exempted from sales tax certain vehicles purchased in Utah
by nonresidents for use outside the state. This exemption
applied to "all sales of vehicles of a type required to be registered under the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Laws of this
state." This is but another indication that the legislature
originally intended the sales tax to apply to "vehicles of
the type required to be registered" and the term motor vehicles should be so construed.
All of the foregoing considerations clearly show that
the term "motor vehicle" as used in the Utah Sales Tax Act
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was meant to include all vehicles subject to registration in
this State.
Even if the court should find that the Sales Tax Act
was not necessarily intended to tax all vehicles subject to
registration, still we submit that a semi-trailer is a "motor
vehicle" within the contemplation of the Sales Tax Act. The
semi-trailer is merely a part of the truck or unit. This unit
would consist of a tractor and one or more trailers or semitrailers. All are combined together to form the motor vehicle. The fallacy of appellant's argument becomes apparent when carried to its logical conclusion. They could just
as reasonably argue that a spare tire, or the motor, or the
body, or any other part of the truck is not in and of itself
a "motor vehicle" and we would have to agree. However,
when all these component parts are put together, the product clearly becomes a motor vehicle under any definition.
It would seem that the back end is just as much a part of
the truck as the front end.
Contrary to the statement made on page 16 of appellant's brief, many cases involving a variety of fact situations have held that semi-trailers or trailers are motor vehicles.
The case of State v. Schwartzman Service, Inc., 40 S.
W. 2d 479 (Mo. 1931) involved a conviction for the operation of a "motor vehicle" having excess gross weight. The
court in stating that the intention of the legislature should
prevail over the literal sense of terms, held that a semitrailer was a motor vehicle. See also Eddleman v. City of
Brazil, 166 N. W. 1 (Ind. 1929), which held to the same
effect.
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In Department of Motor Transportation v. Trailer Convoys, Inc., 279 S. W. 2d 815 (Ky. 1955) it was held that
semi-trailers were "motor vehicles" within a statute giving
tax advantages to transportation of new motor vehicles,
notwithstanding that trailers were not self propelled.
In Prudential Insurance Co. of Great Britain v. Associated Employers, Lloyds, 250 S. W. 2d 477 (Texas 1952)
the court was called upon to construe an insurance policy
which insured only accidents involving two or more motor
vehicles. In an accident where a truck and semi-trailer
overturned, it was held that the accident did not involve two
motor vehicles, however, it was noted by the court that a
trailer pulled by a motor vehicle may become part of said
motor vehicle in spite of the fact that no statute provides
that a trailer is a motor vehicle.
In Fruehauf Trailer Company v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 75 S. E. 2d 688 (S. C. 1953) a trailer was
held to be a "motor vehicle" under a statute providing for
a lien on motor vehicles in favor of one injured or damaged
through negligence or reckless operation thereof.
In Vest v. Kramer, 106 N. E. 2d 105 (Ohio 1955) it
was held that a two-wheeled utility trailer designed for and
employed in general highway transportation and attached
to and operated as a unit with an automobile, which provides the motive power for the unit, is a motor vehicle within
the Ohio statute.
And in Grendreau v. State Farm Fire Insurance Co. of
Bloomington, 288 N. W. 225 (Minn. 1939) an automobile
trailer was held to be a "motor vehicle" under a statute
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dealing with insurance on "automobiles, motorcycles and
other motor vehicles."
Even though the Motor Vehicle Act in Utah appears
to exclude trailers and semi-trailers from the definition of
a motor vehicle, yet the same act for some purposes treats
trailers and semi-trailers as a unit with the tractor which
pulls it, which clearly falls within the definition of a "motor vehicle." See, for example, Sec. 41-1-88, U. C. A. 1953,
as amended which provides as follows:

"* * * provided that no such fee or any
other registration fee shall be required with respect
to any semi-trailer or trailer registered outside the
state where it is shown to the satisfaction of the
state tax commission that such semi-trailer or trailer
is being pulled by a tractor * * * whick is registered within the state of Utah in conjunction with
a semi-trailer or trailer likewise registered within
the state of Utah." (Emphasis added.)
It therefore appears that the Sales Tax Act when considered in its entirety clearly manifests the intention of the
legislature that semi-trailers and all other vehicles of a type
subject to the registration and licensing provisions of the
Utah law are to be classified as motor vehicles within the
meaning of the Sales Tax Act.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
THE ACTION SINCE IT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE.
The legislature in adopting the Sales Tax Act set up
an administrative procedure by which unsatisfied taxpay-
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ers could object to tax assessments made by the commission.
The applicable statutory provisions which set up this procedure are as follows :
59-15-12.

Objection to Assessment Hearing.-

Petition -

"If any person having made a return and paid the
tax provided by this act, feels aggrieved by the assessment made upon him by the tax commission, he
may apply to the tax commission by a petition in
writing within 10 days after the notice is mailed to
him for a hearing and a correction of the amount of
tax so assessed, in which petition he shall set forth
the reasons why such hearing should be granted and
the amount by which such tax should be reduced.
The tax commission shall notify the petitioner of
the time and place fixed by it for such hearing.
After such hearing, the tax commission may make
such order in the matter as may appear to it just
and lawful and shall furnish a copy of such order
to the petitioner."

59-15-13.

Decision of Commission, When Final.-

"Every decision of the Tax Commission shall be in
writing and notice thereof shall be made to the vendor within ten days, and all such decisions shall become final upon the expiration of 30 days after
notice of such decision shall have been mailed to the
vendor, unless proceedings are taken within said
time for review by the Supreme Court upon writ
of certiorari as herein provided, in which case it
shall become final, (1) when affirmed or modified
by the judgment of the supreme court; (2) if the
Supreme Court remands the case to the tax commission for rehearing, when it is thereafter determined
as hereinabove provided with respect to the initial
proceeding."
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59-15-14. Review by Supreme Court. "Within 30 days after notice of any decision of the
tax commission, any party affected thereby may
apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
for review for the purpose of having the unlawfulness of such decision inquired into and determined.
Such writ shall be made returnable not later than
thirty days after the date of the issuance thereof,
and shall direct the tax commission to certify its
records, which shall include all the proceedings and
the evidence taken in the case to the court. Upon
the hearing, no new or additional evidence may be
introduced, but the case shall be heard on the record
before the tax commission as certified to by it. The
decision of the tax commission may be reviewed both
upon the law and fact and the provisions of the code
of civil procedure of this state relating to appeals so
far as applicable and not in conflict with this act
apply to the proceedings in the Supreme Court under
the provisions of this section."
59-15-15. Exclusive Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.
"No court of this state, except the Supreme Court,
shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul
any decision of the tax commission or to suspend or
delay the operation or execution thereof; provided,
that a writ of mandamus shall lie from the Supreme
Court in all proper cases."
The taxpayer in the instant case, ignoring the above
provisions, simply paid the tax under protest then brought
an action for recovery in the district court. Never at any
time did it apply to the tax commission for a hearing of
this matter.
Apparently appellant justifies its manner of procedure
by Section 59-11-11, U. C. A. 1953, which provides as follows:
"In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses or other
demands for public revenue which is deemed unlawSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ful by the party whose property is thus taxed, or
from whom such tax or license is demanded or enforced, such party may pay under protest such tax
or license, or any part thereof deemed unlawful, to
the officers designated and authorized by law to
collect the same ; and thereupon the party so paying
or his legal representative may bring an action in
any court of competent jurisdiction against the officer to whom said tax or license was paid, or against
the state, county, municipality or other taxing unit
on whose behalf the same was collected, to recover
said tax or license or any portion thereof paid under
protest."
It should be pointed out that Sec. 59-11-11, U. C. A.
1953 is not part of the Sales Tax Act. On the contrary, it
was adopted long before the sales tax ever came into existence. Chapters 1 to 10 of Title 59, U. C. A. 1953, deal
with the property tax. Chapter 11 of Title 59, U. C. A.
1953, is entitled "Miscellaneous Provisions," and it directly
follows the property tax provisions. An analysis of many
of the other sections in this miscellaneous chapter reveals
that they apply only to the property tax. Admittedly the
procedure outlined in Section 59-11-11, U. C. A. 1953 has
been followed with respect to some taxes other than the
property tax, but no instance has been found where it has
ever been applied to the sales tax.
In the case of State Tax Commission v. Katsis, 90 Ut.
406, 62 P. 2d 120, the Tax Commission, proceeding under
what is now Section 59-15-11, U. C. A. 1953, brought an
action in the district court to recover unpaid delinquent sales
tax. After the action was commenced, Katsis questioned
the validity of the assessment. In noting that he had never
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applied to the commission for hearing or a correction the
court stated:
"If a person assessed fails to apply for a hearing
and correction within ten days, he has barred himself from further review of the commission's assessment, and he cannot open up the question of proper
amount or validity of the assessment when the processes of the court are used by the commission to
obtain a judicial declaration of indebtedness."
Although the outcome of the case turned on other grounds,
the above-quoted language would seem to imply that a tax
assessment must stand unless attacked in the proper statutory manner.
The Katsis case was cited with approval in State Tax
Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Ut. 177, 100 P. 2d 575,
where the Supreme Court in speaking about the sales tax
stated:
"There are administrative provisions for a hearing and for a determination of the justness of this
claim which may be invoked by the taxpayer, who
may also bring certiorari to the Supreme Court.
* * * Only by invoking the above mentioned
administrative procedure may the tax debtor question the tax or deficiency as assessed. He cannot
collaterally attack the tax or deficiency so found,
except in limited respects * * * He cannot sit
by and wait for the tax commission to sue him and
then raise all the questions which he might have
raised if he had taken advantage of his rights under
the law. He must exhaust his administrative remedies." (Emphasis added.)
In 1937, at the first session of the legislature subsequent to the decision in the Katsis Case, the legislature
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amended Sec. 59-15-11 to its current form, which greatly
facilitates the collection remedies of the Tax Commission.
At the same session the legislature enaced the Use Tax
Act, which is the correlative of the Sales Tax Act, the
former applying only to sales of tangible personal property
made outside the state where the goods were purchased for
use in Utah. As part of the Use Tax Act the legislature
provided in Sec. 59-16-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, that
the person paying the tax may pay under protest and sue
in court to recover. However, the legislature added some
limitations which are peculiar to the Use Tax Act, e. g. that
only the courts of Salt Lake County should have jurisdiction, and that the period of limitation of actions should be
six months. In spite of the fact that the Sales and Use Tax
Act are closely associated in purpose, and that the legislature passed an amendment to the Sales Tax Act at the same
time it enacted the Use Tax Act, no ·provision for payment
under protest and suit to recover was then or later included
in the Sales Tax Act, while such a provision was included in
the Use Tax Act.
Similar provisions for payment under protest with
suit to recover are found in connection with other taxes.
For example, with relation to the Mine Occupation Tax the
legislature set up an administrative procedure very similar
to that provided in the Sales Tax Act (See 59-5-74 to 77,
U. C. A. 1953). However, in the Mine Occupation Tax the
legislature after vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to review decisions of the tax commission
further provided in Section 59-5-77, U. C. A. 1953:
"Any taxpayer may pay his occupation tax
under protest and thereafter bring an action in any
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court of competent jurisdiction for the return
thereof as provided by 59-11-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953."
Some taxes, such as the franchise and privilege taxes
levied against corporations have provisions similar to those
contained in the Sales Tax Act, giving exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to review the decisions of the
Tax Commission. Other taxes, such as the individual income tax, tobacco and oleomargarine taxes, motor fuels tax,
etc. make no mention at all of any procedure to review a
tax commission determination. It is submitted that Sec.
59-11-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, was meant to provide
relief only where the legislature did not set out any specific
procedure to be followed, but that it would not apply where
the legislature as in the Sales Tax Act has specifically provided for an exclusive method of review. Particularly is
this the case where the latter enactment is the later expression of the legislative will. Becker Products Co. v. State
Tax Commission, 89 Ut. 587, 58 P. 2d 36; Nelden v. Clark,
20 Ut. 382, 59 P. 524.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint should be sustained.

Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
BEN E. RAWLINGS,
JOHN G. MARSHALL,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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